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Headley, Beth, M.A., Spring 2007     Philosophy 
 
Feminist Theories of Autonomy and their Implications for Rape Law Reform 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Bridget Clarke 
 
  Liberal notions of autonomy have shaped our laws, and perhaps more 
importantly, the way we think about ourselves. In this paper, I discuss various 
theories of autonomy, and their problems—specifically their implications for 
understanding human subjects and their experiences. I am particularly 
concerned with the role of gender in these theories, and want to know whether 
women’s autonomy is meaningfully different than men’s autonomy—that is, if 
gender inequality significantly influences or determines women’s actual choices.  
  In chapter one, I discuss Joel Feinberg’s liberal theory of autonomy, which 
describes an unhindered, self-governing agent, free to pursue his or her own 
goals. In chapter two, I discuss some feminist responses to liberal theories, and 
lay out Catharine MacKinnon’s theory of dominance feminism. MacKinnon 
claims women have the capacity for autonomy, but pervasive systems of gender 
inequality do not allow them to exercise it. In chapter three, I discuss Kathryn 
Abrams’ theory of agency—a response to MacKinnon’s dominance feminism. 
Abrams thinks women’s autonomy is better described as partial or constrained 
as opposed to nonexistent. Abrams offers a rich conception of agency and 
challenges us to look at what counts as autonomous action in a new way.    
  In chapter four, I argue that the most comprehensive theory of autonomy will 
involve both MacKinnon and Abrams. While Abrams’ theory focuses on 
women’s struggles to exercise agency within systems of oppression, MacKinnon 
offers an explanation of the patriarchal systems that create and maintain those 
conditions.  
  Together, Abrams’ and MacKinnon’s theories can help us better understand 
situations in which women’s autonomy is called into question. Their analyses are 
particularly illuminating with regard to rape and other coercive sexual 
interactions. The law has difficulty determining what counts as rape—or rather, 
when sex becomes rape. In chapter five, I analyze three cases that do not fit the 
law’s current definition of rape. Abrams and MacKinnon show us how the law 
should be expanded to cover some of the more difficult cases.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Joel Feinberg and Liberal Theories of Autonomy 
 
Philosophers disagree about how to conceive of autonomy. In The Theory 
and Practice of Autonomy, Gerald Dworkin examines various theories of 
autonomy and finds it has been equated with “liberty, self-rule, sovereignty, 
freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility, self-knowledge, self-assertion, critical reflection, freedom from 
obligation and absence of external causation.”1  
Notwithstanding the dispute among philosophers, most theories of 
autonomy can be divided into two major categories: those that focus on the 
independence in acts and agents, and those that focus on the rationality in acts 
and agents. Independence-focused theories of autonomy see agents as being 
independent from something, and this freedom may be “more or less complete.”2 
This type of autonomy is a desirable trait, and agents must work hard to achieve 
it. On the other hand, rationality-focused theories of autonomy describe it as an 
inherent characteristic of humans, a trait they either possess or lack. In other 
words, agents cannot be more or less autonomous. This type of autonomy cannot 
be developed or achieved, and does not depend on being free from the 
constraints of external factors. It is not a matter of being independent from 
something, but being internally rational or coherent.3 One of the most influential 
theories of autonomy, that of Immanuel Kant, is particularly focused on 
rationality. Many modern political theorists, including John Rawls, are Kantians. 
Like Kant, their analysis of autonomy is closely linked with rights. In order to 
                                                 
1 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 6. 
2 Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 29-30. 
3 Ibid. 
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exercise rights, agents must have autonomy, and rights are important because 
they “protect autonomous action.”4  
In Bounds of Justice, Kant scholar Onora O’Neill identifies the key 
problems with both of these theories. Independence focused theories of 
autonomy imply any independent or unconventional action can be seen as 
autonomous, even those that might be illegal or dangerous. These theories 
describe autonomy as a valuable characteristic to possess, but simply acting in a 
way that is independent from something does not in and of itself make it 
valuable. As O’Neill notes, “Independence per se does not seem to be either 
necessary or sufficient for an act to be morally valuable or an agent to be 
excellent.”5 On the other hand, rationality based theories of autonomy exclude 
the idea of independence altogether. This causes O’Neill to wonder whether acts 
of obedience or subordination, which may be entirely rational and coherent, can 
truly be considered autonomous. For the best account of autonomy, she thinks 
both types of theories must be combined to include independence, rationality, 
and coherence.  
Theorist Joel Feinberg agrees that autonomy has no single meaning, but 
attempts to reconcile some of the above ideas. He thinks the most complete 
account has four aspects: (1) the “capacity” to self-govern, (2) the “actual 
condition” of self-government, (3) an “ideal” conception of self-government, and 
(4) the “sovereign authority” to self-govern.6 Feinberg attempts to describe the 
way these four meanings of autonomy relate to give a comprehensive picture of 
what it means to have personal autonomy.7 
Having the capacity to self-govern is necessary in order to have the right 
to self-govern, and the capacity involves having the ability to make rational 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 32. 
5 Ibid., 31. 
6 Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy,” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John 
Christman (NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), 28-29.   
7 Ibid. 
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choices. Those people who have the capacity are considered “competent” to self-
govern. People who are not considered competent include infants, the insane, the 
senile, the severely retarded, and people in comas. There are varying degrees of 
competency, but all people must meet the minimal requirements in order to be 
considered competent to govern themselves. Feinberg calls this a “threshold 
conception of natural competence, “ and it is used to stipulate “necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the sovereign right of self-government.”8 Some people 
may have more intelligence or better judgment, but they are not more qualified 
to self-govern than those with less intelligence or worse judgment. While these 
degrees of capacity do not matter for someone to be competent to govern him or 
herself, they do matter when considering the actual conditions of autonomous 
agents. 
 People may have the capacity to self-govern, but if they are not under 
favorable conditions, they cannot exercise this capacity. Having the capacity does 
not necessarily mean people actually govern themselves. Feinberg acknowledges 
that these conditions are often out of people’s control, and this is simply bad 
luck. For example, people cannot exercise their autonomy if they are enslaved or 
become ill and lapse into a coma. In other words, “A certain amount of good 
luck, no less than capability, is a requisite condition of de facto autonomy.”9 
Feinberg thinks opportunities are available to most people under “normal” 
circumstances, and that it is up to the autonomous agent to pursue them. This is 
the aspect of autonomy many feminists and critical race theorists take issue with. 
If “normal” conditions are oppressive, then certain people will be systematically 
disadvantaged regardless of their capacity to self-govern. This is not simply “bad 
luck.” I will discuss this critique in greater detail in chapter two. 
 Feinberg’s third aspect of autonomy describes the ideal virtues that are 
part of being a self-governing agent. The ideal autonomous agent would have all 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 30.   
9 Ibid., 31.  
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of these traits in the right degree, although in actuality these virtues vary in 
degree and combine in different ways within particular agents. They include self-
possession, distinct self-identity, authenticity, self-creation, self-legislation, moral 
authenticity, moral independence, integrity, self-control, self-reliance, initiative, 
and responsibility for self. Feinberg admits that not all of these character traits 
are equally important in order to be an ideal autonomous agent; some of them 
might not even be considered virtues when played out in real life. For example, 
moral authenticity does not necessarily mean the person has good moral 
principles as opposed to evil ones. In fact, Feinberg recognizes that all of the 
above “virtues” could be consistent with deep moral flaws. Clearly, these 
character traits cannot be the whole ideal. Still, “all other things being equal,” 
Feinberg thinks it is better to be autonomous than not. 
People must have the above virtues in the right degree in order to 
consider them virtues. For example, the trait of self-reliance might involve not 
binding oneself to others any more than necessary. A self-reliant person does not 
have indispensable people in his life, nor does he rely too heavily on the 
commitments of others. Of course, the ability to be self-reliant when necessary 
could be virtuous, but avoiding commitments to others altogether seems anti-
social. Furthermore, being able to work cooperatively with others might be 
considered a virtue. Feinberg is reminiscent of Aristotle in saying people must 
have the right kind of virtue in the right degree. In the wrong degree, “Self-
control can be totalitarian repression, and self-discipline can become self-
tyranny.”10     
The final facet of Feinberg’s account of autonomy describes it as a right—
that is, the way personal autonomy is analogous to a state’s sovereignty. In the 
case of states, sovereignty is the “ultimate source of authority.” While Scotland 
and Wales have local autonomy, Great Britain has sovereignty, and can revoke 
local autonomy if it chooses. Whereas local autonomy is a privilege, sovereignty 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 45.  
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is a “basic and underivative” right. The analogy, then, is between sovereign 
nations and sovereign persons.11 Feinberg thinks this right is “natural” for people 
as well as states. To say someone is a sovereign person is redundant; the type of 
self-governing autonomy Feinberg describes is already included in the concept of 
“person.”   
Liberal theorists like Feinberg presuppose a particular type of agent who 
has the capacity for autonomy. This is based on the idea that humans beings are, 
first and foremost, separate from each other. Being an individual with a distinct 
separate life is a key part of what it means to be a human being. In a liberal state, 
people are individuals first; only then do they engage in relationships and 
connect with others.12 Robin West calls this conception of the human being “the 
separation thesis.” This separation from the “other” results in “an existential 
state of highly desirable and much valued freedom: because the individual is 
separate from the other, he is free from the other.”13 Legal liberalists assume this to 
be the universal human condition—that is, people are all equally free. And 
because they are separate and free, they are autonomous, at least in terms of the 
capacity for autonomy. People have a right to their freedom and the government 
(as well as other people) must respect this right; our ends are our ends, and our 
life is our own. The biggest fear of the autonomous person is a restriction of that 
freedom, or in the worst case scenario, “annihilation by the other.” Because you 
are not me, and your ends are not my ends, you may try to restrict me from 
pursuing my goals. While autonomy is the “official value” of liberalism, 
“annihilation by the other” is its official harm.14 All human beings desire the 
same thing (autonomy), and we all fear the same thing (revocation of our 
freedom). 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 46.  
12 Robin West, “Jurisprudence and Gender,” University of Chicago Law Review 55 (1988): 2. 
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
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Traditional liberal theorists do acknowledge these sorts of influences, and 
take into account that all people have histories, as well as commitments to 
others.15 However, these “entanglements” are not at the heart of what it means to 
be an autonomous individual. The possibility that a person’s history or 
relationships may significantly constrain his or her choices is more an exception 
than the rule. Liberal theorists often assume people can, and do, “successfully 
extricate themselves from such influences.”16 The empirical question of whether 
they do, or have the capacity to do so, is often ignored. Feinberg thinks 
autonomous individuals maintain “rational self-direction” in the face of all these 
influences. Feinberg assumes it is possible for individuals to separate themselves 
from “the claims and incursion of others,” and that autonomous individuals are 
not “subject to the influence of, or confined within relationships to, others.”17 
If people cannot separate themselves from these types of influences in the 
ways Feinberg suggests, more analysis of what it means to be autonomous is 
needed. In the next chapter, I will discuss Catharine MacKinnon’s theory of 
dominance feminism, which questions women’s ability to separate themselves 
from the influence of masculine ideology.  
                                                 
15 Kathryn Abrams, “From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self 
Direction,” William and Mary Law Review 40 (1998-1999): 807. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., 809. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Responses to Liberalism: 
Catharine MacKinnon and Dominance Feminism 
 
Feminist theorists have criticized Feinberg’s version of the completely free 
and separate self, highlighting the ways the liberal account of autonomy is 
flawed. Kathryn Abrams argues that “liberal theorists have developed their 
conceptions of autonomy at some distance from those attributes of human 
subjects, such as emotional or relational interdependence and strong gender-
related socialization that bear heavily on the lives of women.”18 The 
paradigmatic legal subject is unconstrained by external influences, such as power 
structures and diverse social circumstances. This is not to say liberalism ignores 
the ways humans become socialized or have relationships with others, but that 
these factors are not central to what it means to be an individual. 
Some feminist theorists have questioned whether people, especially 
women, actually can separate themselves from these sorts of influences—
whether their motivations and influences are authentically their own. While 
Feinberg acknowledges factors like gender, race, and class, these factors do not 
play a central role in the liberal analysis of the autonomous self. Diane Meyers, 
author of Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, takes a 
different approach. Instead of focusing solely on what autonomy should be, she 
proposes making a stronger connection between the empirical and the 
conceptual when defining autonomy.19 Meyers cares about whether autonomy 
can be achieved and by whom. She is particularly concerned with specific 
groups, such as women, who may be excluded from traditional definitions of 
autonomy. 
Meyers focuses on what she calls the “traditional woman” to show how 
the liberal definition of autonomy needs to be altered. The traditional woman is 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 818. 
19 Ibid. 
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“one who is strongly socialized to feminine norms and devotes herself primarily 
to the care of her family.”20 Because of her role as a caregiver, she often puts 
others’ needs before her own and may not be able to pursue her own goals. 
Meyers also notes how her “choice” to fulfill this role may have been a product 
of socialization that dictated which roles were appropriate or valuable for 
women. Her goals and motivations may not be her own, and to that extent, she 
does not have autonomy. However, Meyers thinks it is better to understand her 
autonomy as being restricted or qualified, as opposed to nonexistent. While 
Feinberg thinks of autonomy as a capacity, Meyers understands autonomy as a 
“competency, or set of ‘introspective, imaginative, reasoning, and volitional 
skills’ that makes it possible to act in self-aware and self-directed fashion.”21 In 
re-characterizing autonomy as a competence, Meyers shows how it is better 
understood on a continuum, rather than an “on-off switch.”22 
While this re-conception of autonomy is a valuable contribution, Kathryn 
Abrams argues that Meyers’ views of women’s socialization are too narrow and 
fails to “capture the breadth, complexity, or contingency of the process of social 
construction.”23 Many women do not fit the role of the “traditional woman,” and 
their experiences are excluded from Meyers’ account. Furthermore, Meyers does 
not discuss issues of power or sexualized dominance, nor does she address 
theories of “ideological determinism.” 
Catharine MacKinnon is particularly critical of the ways issues of power 
and oppression liberalism ignores, as well as the practices of “sexualized 
dominance” that shape women’s lives in fundamental ways.24 Catharine 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 813. 
21 Ibid., 815. 
22 Ibid., 817. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 818. 
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MacKinnon is generally considered the founder of “radical” feminism, and her 
writing is most often cited in the ongoing discussion.25    
MacKinnon’s theoretical framework, in which the focus is on women’s 
victimization, is often referred to as “dominance feminism,” which highlights the 
“sexual domination of women and the eroticisation of that dominance through 
pornography and other aspects of popular culture.”26 She argues that the 
illumination of masculine power structures has vast implications for women’s 
autonomy. Dominance feminism shows how sexualized dominance constrains, 
and often inhibits, women’s autonomous choices. While MacKinnon is 
particularly concerned with sexual autonomy, her theory also has implications 
for women’s autonomy per se. Because it is so pervasive, the systematic “sexual 
domination” MacKinnon describes affects more than just women’s sexual 
choices. MacKinnon argues that women’s place in society is not only different, 
but inferior, and that gender differences are social, not natural or individual. 
Women do not choose their societal role as second class citizens; it is enforced. 
MacKinnon concludes, “The feminist view of women’s situation comes to this: 
across time and space, there is too much variance in women’s status, role, and 
treatment for it to be biological, and too little variance for it to be individual.”27     
While MacKinnon’s theory calls women’s autonomy into question, the 
implications of the theory are often misunderstood. MacKinnon is not saying 
women lack the capacity for autonomous choice. Rather, she is critical of the 
actual conditions that inhibit women’s ability to exercise their autonomy. Feinberg 
also makes the distinction between autonomy as capacity and autonomy as 
condition, although he thinks normal conditions are such that most people can 
                                                 
25 Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminism 
Jurisprudence,” Signs 8 (1983): 635, 639. MacKinnon claims radical feminism is feminism, or as 
she refers to it in her book, “feminism unmodified.”  
26 Elizabeth M. Schneider, “Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and 
Agency,” New York Law School Review 38 (1993): 387. 
27 Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 25.  
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exercise their autonomy. For Feinberg, an abnormal condition would be if one 
person were “an unwilling slave to another.” In this case, a person would “fall 
short of autonomy in the sense that he does not actually govern himself, 
whatever his rights and capacities.”28 Feinberg thinks these types of conditions 
are merely bad luck, and that opportunities are available for most people to 
exercise their autonomy. In many ways, MacKinnon thinks women are unwilling 
slaves to men (whether they realize it or not), and the oppression is systematic as 
opposed to bad luck. Furthermore, she thinks the opportunities to exercise 
autonomy are not available to most under current societal conditions, but are 
rather available to those in power; in this case, men.    
Because MacKinnon thinks most women are not aware of the extent to 
which they are oppressed, her theory is often referred to as a false consciousness 
theory. This is the idea that women are not aware that their choices are not truly 
their own, but are rather determined by gender ideology. In other words, the 
systematic oppression of women does not allow them to truly make their own 
decisions. If we keep Meyers’ idea of a spectrum of autonomy, false 
consciousness theories—also called ideological determinism—would be furthest 
away from the liberal theories discussed in chapter one.  
Kathryn Abrams cites three elements of ideological determinism that are 
similar to Marxist false consciousness arguments.29 First, it explains how women 
make decisions that actually contribute to and prolong the cycle of their own 
oppression. Second, women’s decisions are products of “internalization”—that 
is, women have internalized the ideology of the dominant group (in this case, 
men). And third, women are under the impression that their decisions are, in 
fact, “freely chosen”; they are not consciously aware they have internalized 
masculine ideologies. For Catharine MacKinnon, heterosexual relationships are 
                                                 
28 Feinberg, “Autonomy,” 31.  
29 Kathryn Abrams, “Ideology and Women’s Choices,” Georgia Law Review 24 (1989-90): 
763.  
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primarily coercive, and women maintain the cycle of gender inequality by 
engaging in those relations. MacKinnon thinks women have bought into the 
cultural myth that heterosexuality is “individual and biological and voluntary,” 
when their choices aren’t actually voluntary in a meaningful way. Just as all 
work is exploitative from a Marxist perspective, all sexuality is exploitative for 
MacKinnon; just because someone enjoys his or her work or a women enjoys sex 
does not make women any less exploited. As MacKinnon points out, women 
enjoying sex wouldn’t be the first time people enjoyed their own subordination. 
In order to fully understand this phenomenon, however, it is important to 
explain MacKinnon’s connection to Marxist theory in more detail.  
For MacKinnon, “Sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism.” Just 
as the process of work transforms people into social beings, “the molding, 
direction, and expression of sexuality organize[s] society into two sexes, women 
and men.”30 Sexuality, which eroticizes dominance and submission in our 
culture, creates gender, the social meaning of “man” and “woman.” The division 
of men and women is akin to the division of classes in Marxism, and desire in 
feminism corresponds to value in Marxism. For MacKinnon, sexuality is a social 
process that “creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire.”31 While workers’ 
social interactions create value, sexuality creates desire. Even though desire is 
traditionally thought of as being natural or biological, MacKinnon claims it is 
actually created by the hierarchal social relations of men and women. The 
following chart helps illustrate how the theories parallel: 
                                                 
30 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 49.  
31 Ibid. 
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MARXISM      FEMINISM 
 
Work      Sexuality 
(social process that shapes the material   (social process that creates desire;   
and social world; how people become social  how society is organized into two 
beings)          sexes, men and women) 
         
  Class      Gender 
(division of workers)      (division of men and women)  
 
  Value      Desire   
(created by interactions between workers)  (created by relations between 
       men and women) 
Both Marxism and feminism are theories of the unequal distribution of power. 
Power is unequally distributed between men and women under the guise of 
difference between genders, which MacKinnon claims is actually dominance of 
one gender over another. In other words, “The difference is, men have power and 
women do not.”32 
 While feminism is analogous to Marxism for MacKinnon, it is not the 
same as socialist feminism. She claims socialist feminism is simply “Marxism 
applied to women” just like “liberal feminism has often amounted to liberalism 
applied to women.”33 What makes radical feminism radical is its departure from 
Marxist methodology—that is, it treats women as a “social group” instead of 
referring to them in “individual, natural, ideal, or moral” terms.34 In both Marxist 
and liberalist terms, the genders are understood as being naturally harmonious, 
with only some minor societal corrections to be made, whereas a post-Marxist 
methodology sees sexism as fundamental to the relationship between the 
genders. MacKinnon explains: 
Where liberal feminism sees sexism primarily as an illusion or 
myth to be dispelled, an inaccuracy to be corrected, true feminism 
sees the male point of view as fundamental to the male power to 
create the world in its own image, the image of its desires, not just 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 51. (emphasis added)   
33 MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” 639.  
34 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 60.  
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as its delusory end product. Feminism distinctively as such 
comprehends that what counts as truth is produced in the interest 
of those with power to shape reality, and that this process is as 
pervasive as it is necessary as it is changeable.35 
 
In this analysis, inequality is created by those in power, and then understood as 
“the truth.” Because she thinks “truth”—or what is mistaken to be truth—is 
created by those with the power to shape reality, it is not surprising MacKinnon 
also thinks laws are created and enforced with the interest of the male gender in 
mind. MacKinnon claims the law mirrors the way men structure their 
experiences. For example, she thinks both the law and men frame sex in terms of 
possession. If sex is permissible with women who are “yours” or available to be 
you, then rape is “sex with a woman who is not yours.”36 If the law understands 
rape in this way, MacKinnon thinks it is not surprising date or marital rapes are 
almost never prosecuted; those women are possessed by the men who rape them. 
In other words, being an acquaintance, girlfriend, or wife entitles the man to sex. 
In cases in which the rapist does not know the woman, she is clearly not his. 
MacKinnon thinks men do not understand their own sexual experiences with 
acquaintances or girlfriends as rape, and the law reinforces their beliefs by 
calling the sex consensual.       
MacKinnon further separates herself from Marxism and other feminist 
theories in her analysis of the state as gender hierarchy. She proposes that the 
state itself is male, and the law treats women the same way men treat women. 
Although the state claims to value equality, its structure is hierarchal in nature 
and controls the social order by “embodying and ensuring male control over 
women’s sexuality at every level.”37 So long as “human” refers to “male,” 
MacKinnon thinks the standards for equality will continue to be in the interest of 
the male gender.  
                                                 
35 MacKinnon, ”Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” 640.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid., 644. 
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MacKinnon proposes that the gendered division of power is maintained 
through and by the state. The state both creates and justifies society, remaining 
legitimate under the guise of being objective while at the same time preserving 
the state’s position as a mirror of society. MacKinnon explains how pseudo-
objectivity is valued and becomes the measure of rationality; what counts as 
reason or rationality is “that which [objectively] corresponds to the way things 
are.” Supposedly, objective epistemology works to maintain the unequal 
distribution of power, even though it appears fair and impartial.    
 For proof that men systematically oppress women, MacKinnon looks to 
the facts about American culture. She describes the paradigmatic situation of 
women as being beaten, molested, assaulted, raped, and harassed. Eighty-five 
percent of women have been sexually harassed at work; 43 percent of girls have 
been sexually abused before they reach the age of eighteen; 44 percent of women 
have been raped or experienced an attempted rape; between 25 and 30 percent of 
women are battered by men in their family. It is not women who have been 
sexually assaulted who are deviant; in fact, according to a study done by Diana 
Russell, only 7.8 percent of women will experience no assault or harassment in 
their lifetime.38 Furthermore, women are not paid for their work inside the home 
and are paid less than men statistically for their work outside the home. 
Prostitution is the only job in which women as a group make more money than 
men; yet, prostitutes may never see their earnings, handing it over to their pimps 
instead.39  
 Since sexuality is the process that creates gender, MacKinnon needs to be 
specific about her definition of sexuality. She thinks it is phenomenological, not 
something that must have a particular content, but “whatever a particular society 
eroticizes.” In our culture, women are objects for men’s pleasure; their 
                                                 
38 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 23, 52-53. From Diana Russell, The Secret Trauma: 
Incest in the Lives of Girls and Women (1986) and Rape in Marriage (1982). This study was a random 
sample of 930 San Francisco households.     
39 Ibid., 51-52. 
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submission is eroticized. Pornography is a paradigm example of sexuality in 
America; it is an “institution of gender inequality.” While generally an issue 
discussed in terms of obscenity and the First Amendment, MacKinnon discusses 
the politics of pornography in terms of sexual exploitation and oppression. 
“Obscenity as such probably does little harm; pornography causes attitudes and 
behaviors of violence and discrimination that define the treatment and status of 
half of the population.”40 On this account, pornography is not a moral issue; it is 
political. 
 MacKinnon argues that how men treat women is a result of who they see 
women as being. Pornography, which institutionalizes the eroticisation of 
dominance, is one medium that shows who women can be. What makes women 
desirable in pornography is their submission and subjection to whatever the 
male desires. Men possess, and women are possessed. As Andrea Dworkin 
articulates, “Pornography is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, 
fantasy, representation, or symbol either. It is sexual reality.” The fact that 
pornography gives male consumers what they want is evidence that 
pornography itself is sexual reality. Men are sexually aroused by watching sex 
objectively, because their “eroticism is, socially, a watched thing.”41 Pornography 
is something to be possessed or consumed, and this consumption is male 
sexuality, while being possessed or consumed is female sexuality.  
 MacKinnon is often criticized for her focus on women’s victimization. 
According to critics, if she describes women as victims, this reinforces the 
stereotype of women as victims and further victimizes them. This critique rests 
on the idea that people may think themselves out of being victims and become 
empowered; or, if victims are not described as such, they will no longer be 
treated as such. However, MacKinnon thinks it is worse to deny women’s 
experiences of victimization than to acknowledge them. MacKinnon’s account of 
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women’s victimization is descriptive and explanatory; it is not the cause of 
women’s victimization. As she says, “How can it be good for women to deny 
what is happening to them? Since when is politics therapy?”42 
 MacKinnon’s focus on women’s victimization not only asks women to 
acknowledge their situation, but it also has implications for their autonomy. 
Whether they are aware of it or not, MacKinnon thinks women are motivated by 
the types of alien influences Dworkin discusses. According to Dworkin, certain 
types of influences inhibit people’s liberty because they are alien to the 
individual. Threats, manipulation, or coercion, for example, are not the types of 
influences people identify as their own. Dworkin thinks these types of influences 
threaten people’s autonomy, and explains, “It is only when a person identifies 
with the influences that motivate him, assimilates them to himself, views himself 
as the kind of person who wishes to be moved in particular ways, that these 
influences are to be identified as ‘his.’”43 Because they are so often motivated by 
threats, manipulation, or coercion, women’s influences are not their own, 
according to MacKinnon. If we look at MacKinnon’s theory from Dworkin’s 
perspective, MacKinnon claims that autonomous individuals who truly identify 
with the influences that motivate them would not choose to be victims.      
 Women’s awareness of their own victimization is crucial for the feminist 
methodology of consciousness raising. Women must become conscious of the 
social reality of being female, and, according to MacKinnon, that men benefit 
from the same system that deprives women. Women must become aware of their 
own oppression and “create a new way of seeing.”44 In the 1960s and 70s, 
consciousness-raising groups allowed women to break the silence and share with 
one another, to connect with one another without the physical presence of men. 
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Within these groups, women were able to “change the validation by creating 
community through a process that redefines what counts as verification. This 
process gives both content and form to women’s point of view.”45 Women could 
finally talk about their experiences and how they define themselves, what they 
think it means to “be a woman.”  
MacKinnon notes that the process of consciousness raising is difficult to 
separate from the women who choose to engage in the practice. Women seem to 
join the groups in response to “an unspecific, often unattached, but just barely 
submerged discontent that in some inchoate way women relate to being 
female.”46 On some level, most women are aware of their status as second-class 
citizens; the consciousness-raising groups reaffirm this feeling and give words to 
the experiences. 
 A key part of MacKinnon’s thesis—that the personal is political—came 
out of consciousness-raising groups. MacKinnon explains its four parts:47 First, 
the social group of men dominates the social group of women. Thus, women are 
also dominated as individuals. Second, women’s subordination is social, not 
biological or natural. Third, the division of gender influences and determines 
women’s feelings in their personal lives and relationships. Fourth, because the 
subordination is not fundamentally individual, but geared toward the social 
group of women as a whole, women must address it as a group. Individual 
action is not enough.   
 It is interesting that MacKinnon is often seen as disempowering women 
by focusing on their victimization. In fact, she thinks the process of 
understanding one’s victimization is empowering. Once women understand 
their experiences within a system of gender subordination, their feelings of 
discontent, frustration, or powerlessness seem appropriate. They are responses to 
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an unjust situation, not personal character flaws. MacKinnon explains, “It is 
validating to comprehend oneself as devalidated rather than as invalid.”48 
Consciousness raising allows women to see that their powerlessness is not 
inevitable; it reaffirms they can act to change their situation. If women criticize 
the idea that women are men’s negation, “it becomes clear for the first time that 
women are men’s equals, everywhere in chains. The chains become visible, the 
civil inferiority—the inequality—the product of subjection and a mode of its 
enforcement.”49 
 While MacKinnon illuminates the systematic nature of women’s 
oppression, we are still left with questions regarding their autonomy. Are social 
conditions really such that women cannot meaningfully exercise their autonomy 
at all? The next chapter attempts to answer this question with a discussion of 
Kathryn Abrams’ theory of partial autonomy, or what she calls “agency.”  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Kathryn Abrams and the 
False Dichotomy of Victimization and Autonomy 
 
Ideological determinism arguments have undergone much criticism, and 
Catharine MacKinnon’s views are often described as essentialist or reductionist. 
Because her theory “attempts to explain a major portion of American social 
reality—gender—on the basis of a single powerful construct,” scholar Frances 
Olsen calls it a “grand” or totalizing theory. Many feminist thinkers are skeptical 
of a grand theory that attributes so many of women’s decisions to one ideology; 
women’s decisions seem to be more complicated than that and result from a 
broad range of influences.50 Furthermore, even if were true that women’s 
decisions are primarily a function of masculine ideologies, it is dangerous to 
ascribe the view to such a large group of people as all women; thus, the criticism 
that MacKinnon’s theory is essentialist. Some feminist scholars have pointed out 
that there is no such category as “all women,” but rather women of different 
races, classes, and sexual orientations.51 To say that all women are affected by 
gender oppression in the same ways is likely false.  
Even more concerning is the inability to critique MacKinnon’s theory from 
within the system of oppression. Women’s personal experiences of “freedom” or 
resisting oppression are not counterexamples for MacKinnon’s theory. She is 
often confronted with women who claim the theory does not apply to them, that 
they consent to and enjoy sex. The false feeling of enjoyment and consent, 
MacKinnon claims, is part of the system. Choosing and enjoying sex may itself be 
“shaped by the practice and ideology of male dominance.” She remarks:   
Many women in this country believe that gender is a crushing 
reality from which no woman is exempt. They also believe, or 
rather act out a belief on a daily basis, that they are or can be 
exempt. If every tacit “present company excluded” exception I 
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encountered on the road were excluded from my analysis, an 
analysis would remain that everyone accepts as generally true, but 
that almost no one—meaning nearly everyone—acknowledges 
applies to them in particular.52 
 
If it is true the analysis applies to everyone, MacKinnon’s understanding 
of women’s experiences ends up being “categorically preferred” to women’s 
perceptions of their own experiences. And insofar as women can never view the 
system of gender oppression from an objective perspective (i.e., from outside the 
system), they are unable to critique the system itself. 
 While MacKinnon does not claim women lack agency in all aspects of 
their lives, she does claim that some of their choices are heavily influenced by 
ideology, and this calls their autonomy into question. Women whose choices are 
“determined” by ideological influences beyond their awareness or control are 
clearly not autonomous agents in the liberal sense, because their actual 
conditions do not allow them to exercise it. This has caused concern among 
many feminists who might otherwise agree with MacKinnon, because they are 
reluctant to say women lack autonomy. Some feminists worry that MacKinnon’s 
focus on women’s victimization will only exacerbate the oppression of women.  
Martha Mahoney portrays the fight against oppression in two stages: first 
defining the situation, then confronting the situation. She, and other theorists 
such as Kathryn Abrams and Elizabeth Schneider, think the abuses of women 
must be “explained without defining the woman herself by the experience of 
abuse.”53 Whereas MacKinnon describes violence and abuse as being 
paradigmatic of women’s experience, these theorists wish to separate women’s 
experiences of abuse from the definition of “women.” Mahoney argues that 
victimization and agency are not mutually exclusive, and that women’s 
experiences are much more complicated than MacKinnon’s depiction. Not only is 
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victimization versus agency a false dichotomy, but Mahoney and her 
contemporaries argue that the focus on victimization is a poor choice 
strategically. For one, it is offensive to women who have successfully resisted 
societal oppression. Moreover, a focus on women’s victimization might further 
reinforce ideas of women as weak, vulnerable, or lacking the skills necessary to 
make important decisions. Too much focus on women as victims might be 
especially alienating to those lacking a feminist perspective. Women are seen as 
“whining” and exaggerating the extent of their oppression instead of making 
claims others would be sympathetic to. 
Theorists like Mahoney and Abrams are responding to radical feminism 
within the liberal tradition. In order to reconcile the two, they have attempted to 
find a middle ground—one that recognizes women’s victimization along with 
their resistance and struggles. While MacKinnon thinks oppressive conditions 
inhibit women from fully exercising their autonomy, Abrams and Mahoney 
attempt to define autonomy in a new way. Not only do they think women have 
the capacity for autonomy, but they think women often exercise it in forms not 
traditionally recognized as autonomous action. Abrams and Mahoney think 
women’s autonomy is constrained or partial as opposed to non-existent. Even 
under oppressive situations, they think women can exercise autonomy. If we 
continue to view autonomy on a continuum, with MacKinnon’s dominance 
feminism at one end and Feinberg’s liberalism at the other, Kathryn Abrams’ 
theory of agency lies somewhere in between.         
In order to completely separate herself from the baggage of the term 
“autonomy,” Abrams calls her characterization of autonomy “agency.” Agency is 
the autonomy people have within the conceptual framework of socialization, 
where socialization refers to the process by which people are shaped by “social 
norms, images, and practices.”54 Abrams thinks the effects of socialization are 
more pervasive and diverse than Diane Meyers suggests, and thinks the 
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influences are “multiple, specific to particular contexts, and capable of shaping 
and intersecting with each other in innumerable, unpredictable combinations.”55 
Furthermore, Abrams thinks systems of socialization are so complex that it 
becomes unintelligible to talk about distinguishing internal influences from 
external influences. Agency is the ability or capacity people have to be 
autonomous within complex social circumstances. While Abrams focuses 
specifically on the lives of women, she does not think anyone is excluded from 
these influences. To discuss autonomy apart from these influences, or assume 
people can separate themselves from these constraints, is not the right way to 
talk about autonomy. In other words, socialization cannot simply be 
transcended; people must operate within this framework, and it makes no sense 
to talk about agency outside of it. 
Abrams distinguishes between two features of agency: self-definition and 
self-direction.56 Self-definition deals with the way people understand themselves, 
particularly their goals and values. This is closely linked with people’s ability to 
self-reflect and become “aware of the way that one’s self, and one’s self-
conception, are socially constituted.”57 For example, a woman with a poor body 
image may come to realize her feelings of inadequacy are partially due to a 
culture obsessed with thinness. Her feelings of self-worth may be closely tied to 
obtaining a body that is unrealistic and unachievable. Once she realizes how 
much advertising, for example, affects how she thinks she “should” look, she 
may be able to better resist or reinterpret those ideas. Of course, understanding 
the ways we are influenced or constructed does not allow us to completely 
transcend them, but this awareness is part of what Abrams thinks allows people 
to self-define. 
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Another part of self-definition is becoming aware of the “political 
dimension” of social norms. Abrams notes: 
Social or cultural norms that embody negative judgments about 
women’s bodies, women’s competence, or women’s power in 
relation to others are not mere coincidence. They are a product of, 
and a means by which, women’s oppression is perpetuated in 
particular settings. . . These norms make it more difficult for 
women to develop a positive self-conception that permits them to 
take part in a range of satisfying choices or projects.58 
 
Abrams is especially concerned with the “collective aspect” of self-definition. She 
thinks people need to become aware of the ways social influences affect them. 
Often, this cannot be done individually, and people need to communicate with 
others in order to realize how those influences bear on their self-conception. For 
example, the woman with poor body image may become aware of the political 
dimension of the thinness norm when she discovers all her friends have the same 
negative opinions about their bodies. Realizing you are not the only one to feel a 
certain way can empower groups to change and support one another—
something many feminist writers refer to as “consciousness raising.”59 
 The way Abrams understands the “political dimension of social norms” is 
strikingly similar to MacKinnon’s views. Abrams acknowledges the effects social 
norms have on particular groups, especially those who are not in power. It is not 
coincidental that social norms seem to benefit or be in the interest of those in 
power. However, Abrams also acknowledges the complexity of social norms and 
their various meanings in particular contexts. MacKinnon’s analysis of women’s 
social meaning is narrow, focusing primarily on the identity of women as 
oppressed objects for men. Abrams discusses the other social meanings that play 
into a woman’s conception of herself, and how women may be empowered by 
some social meanings and unempowered by others. For example, “black 
womanhood” can have the empowering social meaning of “strong matriarchal 
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head of household,” or the disempowering social meaning of “dependent single 
parent.”60 Because these social meanings are varied, and the creation of identity 
is complex, Abrams thinks it is possible for disempowered groups to develop “a 
self-conception that is authorizing, and at least partially free of the negative 
conceptions that are part of the complicated process of group-based 
subordination.”61 MacKinnon thinks this is possible as well, although difficult 
due to the pervasive nature of masculine ideology. Abrams talks about women’s 
ability to self-define and overcome negative social norms as something they can, 
and do, achieve everyday.           
 The second feature of Abrams theory of agency is self-direction, which 
involves one’s ability to choose one’s own life, to recognize goals and make plans 
to achieve those goals.62 Liberal theorists often talk about this same idea, and 
focus on one’s ability to form his or her own projects and plans and follow 
through, instead of being influenced by others. Abrams, of course, addresses 
how difficult it is to determine whether goals are one’s own or influenced by 
others when social influences are pervasive. In some cases, social norms deter a 
people from choosing (or having the goal of) something that defies that norm, 
even though they might choose it under other circumstances. Abrams gives the 
example of a woman not choosing to do a physically demanding job because of 
the social norms that discourage women from such work. If the woman becomes 
aware that her hesitancy to pursue the job is more a result of gender norms than 
her ability to do the job, she might feel more comfortable pursing it. Still, she 
might encounter other obstacles if she goes ahead and pursues the job. For 
example, the woman might be met with some resentment and possibly sexual 
harassment from her male co-workers. Even if people become aware of how 
social norms affect their goals and choices, other barriers might hinder them 
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from achieving their goals, some of which might be part of a system of social 
inequality.63  
 Abrams redefines self-directive actions, explaining how liberal theorists’ 
conception of self-direction is too narrow. Because we cannot think about self-
direction outside this framework of social norms and obstacles, we need to think 
about how people direct their own lives within it. Abrams thinks self-direction 
within this conceptual framework has two facets: resistant self-direction and 
transformative self-direction.  
 When people are faced with challenges, the ways in which they respond 
often “constitute a form of self-direction.”64 When people respond to these 
challenges, such as overcoming gender norms, varying goals elicit varying 
responses. Transformative self-direction has the primary goal of social or 
political transformation, while resistant self-direction has the goal of resisting a 
particular situation in order to pursue a plan or choice.65 While transformative 
self-direction takes place on a broader scale and involves groups of people, 
resistant self-direction usually takes place individually. 
In the case of resistant self-direction, Abrams describes how certain 
responses to challenges are often not seen as demonstrations of agency, 
especially if it deviates from a direct confrontation. Furthermore, women are 
often the ones who choose alternate ways to respond to situations, resisting 
rather than confronting. One example of this is the way women often respond to 
the challenge of an abusive relationship. While leaving the abusive partner 
would be the most direct way to respond to the situation, many women exercise 
their autonomy in different ways. The question, “Why didn’t she leave?” fails to 
recognize the complexity and constraints of the situation battered women face. If 
leaving is viewed as the only appropriate choice for a woman to make, the other 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 830-831.   
64 Ibid., 832. 
65 Ibid. 
 26 
methods she uses to protect her children and herself are often ignored. In her 
case studies of battered women, Martha Mahoney focused on the ways in which 
women were active, trying to solve their problems, and reaching for solutions. 
The stories Mahoney recounts show the women’s strength within situations, and 
their ability to make choices, even if that choice wasn’t to leave.66 They may save 
money, find support groups, and seek help in a variety of ways. Elizabeth 
Schneider claims this emphasis on leaving is shaped by “liberal visions of 
autonomy, individual action, and individual control and mobility.”67 But as 
Abrams explains, because women do not have complete individual control or 
mobility does not necessarily mean they lack agency. The ways they exercise 
their agency just might not be as obvious or conform to the ways people 
generally think about agency.  
Transformative self-direction usually takes place within groups and has 
the goal of social transformation. Sometimes this involves mobilizing groups of 
women. Abrams cites efforts to unionize secretarial and clerical workers or erotic 
dancers in urban areas, the idea being that a unified group can enact social 
change or even alter social norms.68 Abrams also mentions the “Take Back the 
Night” movement, which gathers women together to confront sexualized 
violence and domination. Women can also choose individual actions that count 
as transformative; for example, refusing to laugh at a sexist joke or standing up 
to a rape attempt. Both of these actions, though individual, have the broader goal 
of challenging social norms. 
While MacKinnon and Abrams disagree about what constitutes 
autonomy, they both have the goal of challenging negative gender stereotypes 
and changing the way women think about themselves. The next chapter argues 
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that we need insights from both MacKinnon and Abrams in order to have a 
comprehensive theory of autonomy.  
 28 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A Comprehensive Theory of Autonomy: 
Catharine MacKinnon and Kathryn Abrams 
 
MacKinnon and Abrams both offer important insights into the way we 
understand autonomy. Abrams’ offers a  rich conception of agency and 
challenges us to look at what counts as autonomous action in a new way. As a 
phenomenological account, it captures women’s resistance and struggles within 
oppressive situations, and reveals the often false dichotomy of victimization and 
agency. MacKinnon explains how practices of sexualized dominance shape 
women’s lives, as well as pointing out the pervasive, systematic nature of 
women’s oppression. While Abrams’ theory explores the particular choices 
women struggle to make under oppressive conditions, MacKinnon offers an 
explanation of the patriarchal systems that create and maintain those conditions. 
Even though Abrams’ and MacKinnon’s theories seem to conflict, a 
comprehensive conception of agency will involve both theorists.    
Abrams’ theory is illuminating in particular, complex situations; however, 
some larger questions are left unanswered. At what point does constraint result 
in a lack of agency? In other words, when do situational constraints become so 
overpowering that women cannot make autonomous choices? Or, the even 
bigger question: why are women consistently in abusive, coercive, and physically 
threatening situations to begin with? We need to recognize women’s agency in 
complex situations as Abrams suggests, but there comes a point when conditions 
do not allow women to exercise it. Clearly defining this point is difficult, but it 
seems to occur when the abuse or coercion is itself the primary motivator for 
decisions, or what Gerald Dworkin calls an “alien” motivation. 
Although he is also liberal theorist, Gerald Dworkin’s conception of 
autonomy offers insights Feinberg’s theory lacks. Dworkin agrees that a person’s 
history and relationships are significant, and that “a viable concept of autonomy 
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must acknowledge these kinds of influences.”69 He stipulates that any workable 
theory must not only be logically consistent, but empirically possible. A theory of 
autonomy that stipulated people could not be influenced by their parents or 
peers, for example, would not be a viable theory. He recognizes the powerful 
effects of socialization, and notes that people learn principles and values before 
they reach an age where they can be critical of them. Clearly, the “unchosen 
chooser” or “uninfluenced influencer” is a myth.  
For Dworkin, the meaning of the term itself is telling. First used to 
describe the Greek city state, “autos” means self, and “nomos” means rule or 
law.70 If a city made its own laws, it had “autonomia.” It is easy to see this 
concept extended to individuals. Those who make their own decisions and are 
not under the control of another have autonomy. Dworkin thinks a person makes 
autonomous choice when he or she “identifies with the influences that motivate 
him, assimilates them to himself. . . that these influences are to be identified as 
‘his.’”71 Besides being able to identify with his own motivations, Dworkin thinks 
an autonomous individual must be connected with his or her own goals—that is, 
those goals are not “in some way alien to the individual.”72  
It is easy to see how coercion or fear would be “alien” motivations. If a 
woman is in an abusive relationship and fears for her or her children’s safety, 
this fear would have a strong influence on her decisions. Even if she recognizes 
that fear as an influence, it is unlikely she would assimilate that influence to 
herself or desire to be the type of person who was motivated by fear or coercion. 
At this point, she does not identify with this motivation as “hers,” but likely 
resents this motivation. She might be connected with her true goals—to care for 
herself and her children and be a good mother—but the alien motivation of fear 
hinders those goals. Thus, the choices she can make to attain her true goal of 
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caring for her children are limited by her fear of abuse. If a woman cannot 
“choose” to end a battering relationship because she is afraid, is she really 
“choosing” to stay in it? Where would we place this type of situation on a 
continuum of autonomy? These are the difficult questions. Abrams can help us 
see subtle ways the woman might exercise her agency despite fear, and 
MacKinnon can help us understand why her decisions may not meaningfully be 
“hers.” 
In many ways, rape is the paradigm example of a situation in which 
women’s agency is called into question. How much her choices are constrained 
depends on the particular circumstances of the sexual interaction. Whether they 
are fearful of actual or implicit threats of violence, or coerced into thinking the 
consequences will be worse if they do not consent, women in rape situations are 
motivated by a wide range of influences. Some rapes are extremely violent; some 
of them are primarily coercive; some of them might just be regrettable sex. Sexual 
interactions, just like autonomy, are best understood on a continuum. 
MacKinnon’s theory is particularly helpful for violent, “clear-cut” cases of rape 
that lie at the far end of the spectrum, and Abrams’ analysis can help us 
understand the more difficult cases in the middle. While MacKinnon tends not to 
distinguish between coercive sexual relationships and rape, Abrams’ theory can 
offer a more nuanced analysis of particular sexual interactions.   
The next chapter explores women’s ability to exercise agency in situations 
in which they are being forced or coerced into sex they do not want. By using 
MacKinnon and Abrams to analyze a few sample cases, we can attempt to 
distinguish which types of sexual interactions count as rape. How we conceive of 
rape will have important implications for how rape law can be revised to best 
protect women’s autonomy. Before considering specific examples, I will offer 
some context in order to better understand rape in America. 
First, it is important to note that most rapes are not reported. According to 
a study by the National Victim Center, eighty-four percent of rapes go 
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unreported, making rape one of the most underreported crimes in America.73 In 
fact, statistics show that fifty-four percent of American women are raped or have 
survived an attempted rape at least once in their lives.74 Of those women, 
approximately twenty-five percent have been subjected to a completed rape, 
according to self-reports.75 Fourteen percent of women report having been raped 
within their marriages, and many states still have no law prohibiting marital 
rape.76 Of the rapes women report to authorities, hardly any are prosecuted, and 
most prosecuted rapes do not result in a conviction. In fact, only between two 
and five percent of accused rapists are convicted, and they usually receive short 
sentences.77   
Part of the problem may be that many of these rapes do not fit the model 
of a “real rape.” According to many people, “real” rape is when a stranger comes 
out of an alley or parking garage, holds a woman down at gun or knife point, 
threatens to kill her, and proceeds to have sex with her. While in these cases it is 
clear that a serious crime has been committed, only a small number of rapes 
actually happen this way. Most rapes deviate from this model. Most women 
know the men who rape them, and say “no” but don’t fight back; most rapes 
happen in bedrooms, not dark alleys, and most women do not sustain physical 
injuries. In fact, seventy percent of rape victims do not receive any physical 
injuries, and twenty four percent only receive minor physical injuries.78 When a 
rape is anything other than a “real” rape, women are much less likely to be 
believed, and the crime becomes more difficult to prove. They may even question 
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themselves, feeling as though what happened to them was their own fault. The 
idea that they “deserved it” may be lurking in the back of their minds.79   
Women are traditionally understood to be the gatekeepers of sex; they, 
not men, are responsible for whether or not sex occurs. Lynne Henderson, author 
of “Rape and Responsibility,” describes the dominant cultural narrative, which 
sees women as the controllers of sex, and it is not surprising when men “lose 
control.” Instead of focusing on the defendant’s behavior, courts often focus on 
the woman, recognizing her as the “primary causal agent.” Women are often 
blamed in the courts and among the general public for “provoking” or failing to 
prevent a rape. As Henderson notes, “In bourgeois culture, in a bizarre distortion 
of causality, girls are raised to believe their dress, makeup, hairstyle, walk, and 
talk determine male reactions.”80 This cultural narrative clearly casts women as 
autonomous agents, capable of controlling their own (as well as men’s) sexual 
encounters. At the same time, women are cast into the “more passive role of 
consenting or not consenting” while men play the role of “actively initiating” 
sexual encounters. Within the law, consent need not be active; acquiescence or 
non-resistance often qualifies as consent. In fact, consent rarely has anything to 
do with whether the woman actually desired to engage in intercourse. A 
woman’s behavior prior to the sexual encounter is much more important. 
Behaviors like “drinking, dancing, agreeing to drive home with a man, or even 
just being sexually experienced, as evidenced by having a live-in boyfriend or 
taking the Pill.”81 Jurors must try to understand the encounter and attempt to 
interpret whether it was “reasonable” for the man to pressure the woman for sex 
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considering her behavior. The legal question is never, “Should he have been 
pressuring her?” but rather, “Did she do enough to resist?”  
 Part of dispelling the “real” rape myth involves understanding the men 
who commit rape. Just as most rapes deviate from the “real” rape model, most 
rapists deviate from the stereotype of a deranged, perverted criminal. In fact, 
most rapists are indistinguishable from non-rapists. In 1988, a survey of 6100 
college-age men showed that forty-three percent had engaged in “coercive sex,” 
meaning they had used physical force or ignored women’s protests.82 In another 
survey of 1846 college-age men, twenty-three percent said they had been in a 
situation where they were so “sexually aroused” that they couldn’t stop 
themselves, even though they knew the woman didn’t want to engage in sex.83 
Even more disturbing, thirty-five percent of college-age men in another study 
said they would commit rape if they were “sure they could get away with it.”84 
No evidence suggests that the class of rapists is psychologically any different 
than non-rapists. Indeed, psychologists have found that mental illness exists in 
only two to twenty percent of convicted rapists in prison, which is similar to the 
incidence of mental illness in criminals who commit other crimes.85  
 The fact that rapists are not psychologically deviant (at least statistically) 
indicates that rape, may, in fact, be “culturally dictated” given the social norms 
that encourage male aggressiveness and assertive behavior. In other words, the 
types of traditionally masculine behavior that accompany rape are considered 
“normal” in most contexts, including within sexuality. Of course, the idea that 
rape is “culturally dictated” is a highly controversial claim, but one for which 
there is much evidence. Understanding gendered differences in sexuality can 
help us see how rape may not be as deviant from the norm as is commonly 
thought. This brings us to a critical question: what is “normal” sex? What are the 
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social norms that accompany men and women’s sexuality? And how do these 
norms bear on the autonomy of sex acts? 
 According to Andrew Taslitz, author of Rape and the Culture of the 
Courtroom, we live in a “cult of masculinity, a cult of aggression.”86 Taslitz notes 
that men and women give different meanings to aggression, which plays itself 
out in the ways men and women behave. While men view aggression as 
“instrumental, a way of controlling others, attaining social or material benefits, 
domination, and self-esteem,” women understand aggression as being 
“expressive, a release of frustration or anger, viewed as a loss of self-control and 
a danger to relationships.” Male aggression is a necessary part of being 
“masculine,” a way to bond with other men, and a way to gain power and 
control others. Male aggression may or may not be associated with anger. 
Because this type of aggression is seen as “necessary” or even “desirable” 
behavior, a much greater amount of aggression is tolerated in men than in 
women. Also, because men tend to use their aggression as a tool to achieve 
domination or other benefits, much of the way they talk about aggression is 
centered around winning or losing. Taslitz says, “The great male fear is of 
losing.” Men may assume that women also view life as a game to be won or lost 
and interpret women’s expressions accordingly. Instead of perceiving women’s 
crying as a sincere emotion, a man may view that expression as a strategy within 
a larger game. Taslitz says this carries over into sexual relationships, “and there 
combines with notions of masculinity that involve explosive sexuality, sexual 
success, independence from relationships, physical toughness, and loss of 
empathy.”87 Men may not perceive their aggressiveness as “force” because they 
are playing by the rules of “fair gamesmanship.” And how do you win a game? 
By being aggressive! Men assume women understand the game of sex and its 
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rules in the same way they do. Therefore, drinking, wearing revealing clothing 
and acting flirtatiously are part of the broader “game” of sex; women should 
understand what they are getting involved in. If a woman did not want to have 
sex, she should not have played the game. These notions are deeply embedded 
within our culture; hence, many women blame themselves for their rape. They 
should have known better.  
On this model of male masculinity, we’re left with the following picture: 
A man may not feel as though he is being forceful or coercive, while the woman 
feels as though her protests (whether verbal or silent) are not being heard. The 
woman feels as though she is expressing her displeasure, while the man 
interprets her resistance as “playing hard to get.” Insofar as men and women do 
not understand force in the same way, it is possible that many rapes (especially 
acquaintance rapes) might be due to miscommunication rather than 
vengefulness. However, a study done by Jodee M. McCaw and Charlene Y. Senn 
shows the opposite may be true. The study, entitled “Perceptual Cues in Dating 
Situations,” tested the ways in which men and women communicate their desires 
and recognize desires of the opposite sex. If the miscommunication hypothesis 
were true, McCaw and Senn assumed there would be distinctive gender 
differences in the way desires were perceived and communicated. In fact, both 
men and women found the same behaviors to be coercive. They also found that 
the men in the study understood the women’s refusal of sex to be a refusal. There 
was little miscommunication or gendered differences between the way the men 
and women understood the situations. McCaw and Senn deduced that “men do 
not inadvertently threaten women into cooperating with sex, but know what 
they are doing.”88 According to this study, a man’s claim that he was unaware of 
women’s resistance or thought she “wanted it” is not an excuse. In fact, men are 
conscious of their coercive (sometimes forceful) behavior, but continue to do it 
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anyway. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. Some cases may be a 
matter of miscommunication, while others may be intentional. 
It is difficult to analyze whether these types of cases should be considered 
rape or not. If we consider sexual interactions on a continuum, with violent rape 
at one end and consensual intercourse at the other, a lot of cases fall in between. 
In the next chapter, I will consider three cases that would not fit the current law’s 
definition of rape. Using Abrams and MacKinnon, I will attempt to analyze 
whether these cases should be considered rape, and if so, how the law could be 
reformed to account for them.      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Autonomy and the Law: 
An Analysis of Rape Cases 
 
Both MacKinnon and Abrams can help us think more clearly about the 
law, particularly laws that address crimes against women. Because laws were 
formed and interpreted based on the assumption that people can fully exercise 
their autonomy, the results are often flawed and harm those who they are 
intended to protect. In this chapter, I explore the ways in which different theories 
of autonomy conceive of rape and how that differs from current rape law. After 
explaining the law’s conception of rape, I will use Abrams and MacKinnon to 
analyze women’s agency in difficult cases that fall somewhere between 
intercourse and rape: (1) a woman who “consents” to sex within a physically 
abusive relationship, (2) a woman who has forced sex with a man she knows, 
and (3) a woman who is coerced into sex within a relationship. In order to 
understand the current law, we need to keep the liberal conception of autonomy 
in mind.   
In a liberal democracy, criminal law has the ultimate aim of protecting 
people’s individual autonomy—that is, the law attempts to protect people’s 
rights to self-determination and their pursuit of their “own conception of the 
good.”89 Minimally, criminal law aims to protect people from harming others, 
and thus, interfering with personal autonomy. It is important to note the 
difference between positive and negative sexual autonomy, since the law’s 
primary purpose is to protect negative sexual autonomy. While positive sexual 
autonomy includes “the freedom to seek out opportunities, choose partners, 
engage in sexual activities that are mutually fulfilling,” negative sexual 
autonomy includes being free from nonconsensual touching or sexual activity.90 
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While the state does protect positive autonomy insofar as other people’s negative 
autonomy is not violated, the primary purpose of criminal law is to protect 
negative sexual autonomy—that is, people have a right to be free from sexual 
assault. Only serious threats to personal autonomy are generally protected under 
criminal law, because the law itself shouldn’t interfere with people’s autonomy; 
if laws are too protective or paternalistic, they may be doing more harm than 
good. 
Most state laws treat women as liberal agents. It is assumed they are free 
to exercise their autonomy and say “no” or stop an attempted rape. Because the 
law assumes women would stop the sexual encounter if they wanted to, 
acquiescence or non-resistance is interpreted as compliance or saying “yes.” This 
is especially true when the two parties know each other, because the law sees 
consent as already implicit in the relationship.   
While rape laws vary among the states, they all consider the factors of 
“force” and “consent.” The biggest difference among state laws is “whether the 
critical element is nonconsent, no matter how much evidence of force and 
coercion is available.”91 In Michigan, for example, the code does not even refer to 
“nonconsent” and instead focuses solely on the defendant’s actions and how 
much force was used. New York State’s Code, on the other hand, is similar to the 
Model Penal Code in its focus on the victim’s consent, although neither code 
refers to the victim’s “subjective nonconsent,” but rather the outward actions of 
resistance that imply nonconsent. Actions such as physical force are much easier 
to corroborate in a court of law than the woman’s subjective nonconsent. To help 
illuminate the type of language state statues use, the Montana State Code is as 
follows: 
A person who knowingly has sexual intercourse without consent 
with another person commits the offense of sexual intercourse 
without consent. The term “without consent” means: the victim is 
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compelled to submit by force against the victim or another; or the 
victim is incapable of consent because the victim is mentally 
defective or incapacitated; physically helpless; overcome by 
deception, coercion, or surprise; or less than 16 years old. The term 
“force” means: the infliction, attempted infliction, threatened 
infliction or bodily injury or commission or a forcible felony by the 
offender; or the threat of substantial retaliatory action that causes 
the victim to reasonably believe that the offender has the ability to 
execute the threat.92     
 
The concept of “force” is very narrow within the law. Force, as such, is not 
prohibited in sexual encounters. It is only prohibited when it is used “to 
overcome female nonconsent.” If a woman does not physically resist in active 
ways (punching, kicking, screaming, etc.), it is questionable whether she was 
truly “forced.” The court must determine whether the force was “sufficient to 
overcome a reasonable woman’s will to resist,” and it is up to the judge and jury 
to determine what a “reasonable” woman’s response should be.93 What counts as 
legal force is generally the use of a weapon, severe beating, or the “explicit 
threats” of these combined with the victim’s belief the threats could actually be 
carried out.94 Holding a woman down or throwing her onto a bed is not by itself 
considered force in the eyes of the law, especially if the two people know each 
other.95 Neither action would necessarily result in “bodily injury,” nor do those 
actions imply that bodily injury was attempted, threatened, or inflicted. 
Depending on the context of the situation, the same actions could be interpreted 
differently. Being thrown onto a bed could be described as a forceful shove or a 
playful push depending on the woman’s desires; while very different subjective 
experiences, these actions might look the same from an outsider’s perspective.  
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And as the statute demonstrates, the law does not describe what counts as 
“consent” or “nonconsent,” but only describes what it means to be “incapable of 
consent.” Whether the woman actually wanted to engage in sex—her subjective 
consent—is not at issue. What matters is whether the woman was capable of 
consenting. If a woman does not meet any of the criteria that deem her incapable 
of consent, the law assumes consent. This is especially true if the two people 
know each other. In the eyes of the law, whether a rape occurred or not has much 
to do with the relationship between the two parties. Even if there is some force 
and the two people know each other, there is usually no rape conviction.96 In her 
book, Is it Rape?, Joan McGregor describes this difficulty within the law: 
Legal practice and social attitudes have trouble recognizing as 
legally impermissible a wider range of sexual interactions, for 
example, nonconsensual sex without force (force in criminal law is 
conceived quite narrowly usually referring only to extreme 
physical force), which often includes acquaintance ‘rapes’. In these 
cases, even where there is force, given that the two are 
acquaintances the law does not recognize them as ‘with force’.97 
 
If the two people know each other, consent is presumed, and there often 
needs to be an even greater amount of physical force to prove nonconsent.98 The 
law permits a lot of aggression and coercion in sexual relationships between 
acquaintances,99 which implies that women might consent to aggression and 
coercion in some cases. This could be one of the reasons people hesitate to call 
acquaintance cases “rape,” and why women do not report them. These sexual 
interactions do not conform to the legal definition of rape.     
The definition of rape that some states use requires force and nonconsent, 
which seems redundant. The Georgia State Code, for example, describes the 
crime of rape as having “carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her 
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will.”100 If sex is forced, why does the law also require nonconsent? Or, if the 
woman didn’t consent, why must she also be forced? MacKinnon thinks this 
conception of rape assumes a “sadomasochistic definition of sex” and indicates 
that forced sex can become consensual.101 Historically, this definition also points 
to the distrust of women’s testimony. If no force were present, the woman might 
claim she didn’t consent in order to cover up a regrettable choice.102 Theorist Joan 
McGregor thinks this “unfortunate conjunction” leaves two primary options for 
rape law reform: (1) rape could become “sexual activity without consent,” which 
makes consent meaningful and focuses on protecting women’s sexual autonomy, 
or (2) the definition of rape could focus on the range of behaviors that are 
“wrongful because they are violent, abusive, or in other ways inappropriate.”103      
Liberal feminists such as Katie Roiphe, Camille Paglia, and Christine Hoff 
Sommers think the law’s conception of rape is appropriate, and that expanding 
rape law would work against women’s attempts to advance equality. Changing 
the concept of rape within the law to include nonconsensual sex without legal 
force, or acquaintance “rapes,” is overly paternalistic, they argue, and makes 
women seem like “incompetent victims.”104 They think these types of rape 
reforms imply that women cannot take care of themselves and require the 
assistance of the state. Paglia argues women should know the risks or dangers of 
sex as well as the risks behaviors like dressing provocatively or drinking too 
much. She argues women should take responsibility for their choices and need to 
cope with the consequences of their own actions rather than deferring to the 
law.105 
 In her book, The Morning After, Katie Roiphe argues that the dangers of 
date rape (or acquaintance rape) have been drastically blown out of proportion, 
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especially on college campuses. Echoing Paglia, she says, “By viewing rape as 
encompassing more than the use or threat of physical violence to coerce someone 
into sex, rape-crisis feminists reinforce traditional views about the fragility of the 
female body and the will.”106 Roiphe is especially dismayed at the idea that 
“verbal coercion” may also constitute a rape. This depicts women as being weak-
willed and unable to stand up to “the barest feather of peer pressure.” According 
to Roiphe, this also implies that men are “not just physically but intellectually 
and emotionally more powerful than women.” Roiphe thinks the law should 
continue to assume the same things about women they do about men: “basic 
competence, free will, and strength of character.” If we do not want women to 
exhibit traditional female characteristics such as passivity in the long-term, the 
law should not be expanded to protect these behaviors in the short-term. Perhaps 
the most effective way of motivating women to give up passive behavior is to 
“penalize” them “by not protecting them.”107 If the law treats women as passive 
victims, the effects may bring about more harm than good. 
 Although she does not explicitly argue against it, Roiphe clearly rejects the 
idea that there are gender differences and thinks “the only valid feminist goal is 
for women to be treated exactly like men.”108 To change rape law, and 
acknowledge other sorts of sexual encounters as “real rape,” would be to 
acknowledge gender differences and thwart the goal of true equality. For Roiphe, 
true equality or sexual freedom is embodied in the liberal male—that is, “the best 
sex is autonomous, ‘free,’ unhampered by any sense of connection to one’s 
partner.”109 She thinks other feminists’ focus on sexual oppression takes the fun 
out of sex and is ultimately a throwback to the Victorian ideal of women as 
chaste virgins. Roiphe thinks changing rape law would not defend sexual 
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autonomy, but undermine it by “enfeebling” women. She thinks expanding rape 
law to include acquaintance rapes is patronizing to women and would ultimately 
backfire against women’s struggle for equality.110 If the law protects these 
“traditionally female” victims from acquaintance rapes now, women will not 
become more assertive and aggressive in the long run.  
Roiphe’s book is clearly a response to dominance feminism, whose 
obsession with sexual oppression, she thinks, has “gone too far.”111 According to 
Roiphe, this type of feminism, and people like Catharine MacKinnon, are 
responsible for “victim culture,” which poses more of a threat to women than 
rape or sexual harassment. Roiphe’s analysis of women’s autonomy in sexual 
relationships is grossly oversimplified and ignores the contributions MacKinnon 
and Abrams have made to feminist legal theory. She does not offer a rich 
conception of agency, nor does she consider all the cases that fall somewhere 
between violent rape and consensual intercourse. By looking at some of the cases 
that fall in the middle of the spectrum, we can see how Abrams and McKinnon 
shed light on complex sexual situations. First, I will look at a case where a 
woman has sex within a physically abusive relationship:  
Commonwealth v. Richter, 1998 
The pregnant ex-wife of the defendant verbally resisted his sexual 
advances but did not physically resist because in the past he had 
been extremely violent toward her and she feared for her own and 
her fetus’s safety. The court found no rape since there was no 
force.112  
 
This case compels us to ask whether the law should conceive of  
nonviolent, nonconsensual sex within a relationship as rape. The ex-husband did 
not use physical force, nor did he harm the woman or her fetus; there was only 
the implicit threat of violence since he had hurt her in the past. The woman 
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“chose” to have sex with her ex-husband rather than fight him because she 
feared for her and her fetus’s life. Does her choice to submit to the sex count as a 
meaningful act of agency?  
Clearly, her choices were constrained by her fear, but Abrams might 
consider this an example of the false dichotomy of victimization and agency. 
Abrams would likely describe the above case as rape, but still say the woman 
exercised her agency. The woman’s goal was to protect herself and her fetus, and 
she chose what she thought would accomplish this goal. She understood her 
situation and acted based on the limited options she had. This situation is not 
much different from wives who consent to sex with their husbands because they 
fear violence. They may decide to endure unwanted sex, knowing their chances 
of being beaten are lessened if they do so. Abrams would probably describe the 
woman in the above case as having a clear sense of self-definition; she 
understands her own goals and values, and also understands how her abusive 
relationship influences them. She knows she wants to protect herself and her 
fetus, and makes the choice that will most likely achieve that goal. She could 
have fought back, she could have run, or she could have screamed. She didn’t 
choose direct confrontation as a response, but this does not mean she lacks 
agency. But is this “choice” to have sex in order to avoid violence a “choice”? 
Despite the lack of physical force, MacKinnon would understand this 
example to be a clear case of rape. MacKinnon thinks rape should be redefined as 
“sex by compulsion, of which physical force is one form. Lack of consent is 
redundant and should not be a separate element of the crime.”113 MacKinnon 
wants the theory of compulsion to be nuanced, one that “captures more than 
actual overwhelming force, but which defines the range of power relationships 
that might compel a person into sex.” Defining what counts as “wrongful 
compulsion” is extremely difficult, though, because people disagree about which 
types of threats (explicit or implicit) should count. The question is, which types 
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of constraints on a person’s choices are illegitimate? MacKinnon thinks using fear 
to intimidate or coerce someone into having sex should count as “compulsion.” 
In this case, the threats were not explicit, but only implied because the defendant 
had been violent before. Should all nonconsensual sex where women are coerced 
by implicit threats count as rape? What type of implicit threats count? Must there 
be a history of violence? What if the ex-husband in the above case had never 
been violent before? Would the woman’s fear have been justified? These types of 
questions often come up in cases where the two parties do not have a 
relationship history, but know each other nonetheless. Take the following case: 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 1994 
A 19-year-old sophomore at a Pennsylvania college one afternoon 
went to the room where her boyfriend lived. While waiting for him 
to return she entered the room of an acquaintance, Robert 
Berkowitz. She sat on the floor and talked with him for awhile. He 
sat on the floor next to her and began kissing and fondling her. She 
protested his advances and said that she had to go. Berkowitz 
disregarded her protests, got up and locked the door, came back 
and pushed her on to the bed, lay on top of her, removed her 
clothes, and penetrated her. Throughout she was saying ‘no.’ 
Berkowitz said he took the ‘no’s to be passionate moaning. He was 
found not guilty of rape because there was no forcible 
compulsion.114 
 
In this case the woman did not know Berkowitz very well and had no 
reason to believe he would be violent from past experience. The woman did not 
physically resist and only verbalized her nonconsent. Berkowitz did not threaten 
her implicitly or explicitly, nor did he use obvious physical force. Should cases 
like this be included in our conception of rape?  
For MacKinnon, locking the door, lying on top of the woman, and 
ignoring her protests would likely count as “wrongful compulsion.” Although 
there were no threats or violence per se, it would have been reasonable for the 
woman to believe Berkowitz might harm her given the circumstances. Pushing 
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someone on to a bed and lying on top of him or her could certainly be 
understood as “force,” although some laws do not see it that way, because 
“normal” sex could include the same actions and not be rape. If we redefined 
what counted as “normal” sex, MacKinnon thinks these types of cases would 
more clearly be considered rape.  
Rape is defined as forced sex without consent, and is supposed to be 
ontologically distinct from intercourse. The law assumes sex in and of itself is not 
harmful or bad, but only becomes so when there is force and nonconsent. 
MacKinnon claims, however, that women’s experiences of sex and rape are not 
so distinct under “conditions of male dominance.”115 What counts as “normal” 
sex is defined from a masculine perspective and is often aggressive and coercive. 
Furthermore, MacKinnon thinks men are systematically conditioned “not even to 
notice what women want.”116 Many men assume that “no” means “yes,” and that 
women are playing hard to get if they refuse intercourse. Men may then use 
force, and think the woman “wanted it.” Until the current conception of 
“normal” sex is seen to violate women, MacKinnon thinks women’s real 
experiences of rape will never be understood. Still, the question of how much 
agency the woman had in the above case is difficult to answer.  
The woman in the above case clearly had more agency than a woman in 
an extremely violent rape situation, although her choices were still constrained 
by fear and shock. It might be reasonable to ask why she did not fight back or try 
to run away, although her response of just laying there “as if in a dream” is a 
common reaction to rape. Becoming silent, crying, or “blocking it out” are 
frequently the ways women respond to rape situations.117 Of course, we can 
wonder if she could have avoided the rape by screaming or fighting, but putting 
a focus on the victim’s responses is exactly what the law should avoid doing. The 
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law could account for these more ambiguous cases by dividing rape into two 
categories: (a) forceful or violent rape, and (b) nonconsensual sex.118 Having two 
categories of rape would help account for the complexities of sexual situations 
that Abrams points out. It would recognize that not all rapes are the same, but 
still acknowledge nonconsensual sex as a crime. 
The first type of rape (forceful or violent rape) is best characterized by 
MacKinnon’s conception of rape as “sex by compulsion.” It would focus on the 
defendant’s violent behavior as the crime, and the violence would negate 
consent. MacKinnon does not think women’s consent is meaningful in rape trials. 
How a woman actually feels about the sexual interaction, or what she says, is 
irrelevant; what matters is “who she is relative to a man who wants her.” 
MacKinnon thinks there are two paradigm categories of women: young girls or 
“virginal daughters” who cannot consent and are rapable, and “whorelike wives 
and prostitutes” who cannot help but consent and are unrapable.119 Once women 
reach adulthood and are no longer virginal daughters, consent is inferred if the 
woman knows the man she has sex with. MacKinnon notes, “If rape laws existed 
to enforce women’s control over access to their sexuality, as the consent defense 
implies, no would mean no, marital rape would not be a widespread exception, 
and it would not be effectively legal to rape a prostitute.”120 
One way to think whether a woman’s consent is meaningful is to consider 
the consequences if she fails to consent. Under coercive conditions, it is unlikely a 
woman would feel free to refuse without consequences. Catharine MacKinnon 
argues that because women have unequal social positions, they are at a 
disadvantage in their relationships with men. Within these relationships that 
MacKinnon deems “coercive,” voluntary consent is unlikely. Ultimately, 
MacKinnon thinks “the imbalance of power present in many (most?) gender 
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relationships undermines the legitimacy of consent.”121 For this reason, she 
thinks the consideration of the woman’s consent should be removed from rape 
law completely. It should not be assumed that women can or do consent to 
coercive, violent behavior. 
Not all coercive sexual situations revoke women’s agency, as Abrams’ 
analysis shows us. In these types of situations, it is important to focus on 
women’s choices to engage or not engage in sex. The second type of rape 
(nonconsensual sex) would focus on the absence of consent, and work to make 
women’s consent more meaningful; thus, protecting their sexual autonomy. If a 
woman has sexual autonomy, she is in control of her own body and can 
determine with whom, how, and under what circumstances she wishes to 
engage in sexual activity; in other words, she controls her own sexual life. Joan 
McGregor adds to this conception by noting, “Saying that autonomous agents 
have control means that they will not be penalized for granting or failing to grant 
consent.”122 Currently, the law seems to protect men’s positive sexual autonomy 
more than women’s negative sexual autonomy by putting the burden of proof on 
the woman to show she was not consenting.123 In other words, the woman must 
prove she was not consenting, making the default position that she was 
consenting. Men can assume women are consenting, unless they physically resist 
in particular ways. Verbal nonconsent is not even meaningful, because the law 
recognizes that “no” sometimes means “yes.” If the law’s goal was to protect 
women’s negative sexual autonomy, it seems the default position would be that 
the woman was not consenting.124 
In cases where there is no obvious force (in the legal sense), judges and 
juries need to look at the types of constraints that would undermine a woman’s 
consent, turning intercourse into rape. Consent should act to protect women’s 
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autonomy and has the moral significance of making the “impermissible, 
permissible.” Joan McGregor argues that consent is a “mechanism by which we 
treat each other as equals, by asking for consent before crossing another’s border 
or taking what is rightfully theirs, whether it is their property or their body.”125 
In order to treat women as equals, men need to respect women’s sexual choices. 
In the case of Berkowitz, for example, the man acted on his own desires while 
ignoring the woman’s thoughts and feelings about the situation. Not bothering to 
find out whether someone consents or disregarding their nonconsent is to treat 
someone as a means to an end in Kantian terms. If consent is not meaningful, it 
does not have the power to protect people’s autonomy.  
 McGregor further argues that consent has the power to transform 
relationships and turn criminal actions into non-criminal ones. Consent is 
“morally transformative,” and can turn stealing into borrowing, assault into 
surgery, or rape into sex. Because it has this power, consent must be “voluntary 
and deliberate” and the person must understand what they are consenting to.126 
The person must also have the intention of consenting. Descriptively, a woman 
may consent to sex by saying “yes,” but the consent is not meaningful if, for 
example, she has a gun pointed at her head. If a woman’s consent is not intended 
or not “voluntary enough to be a true reflection of [her] autonomy,” judges and 
juries should recognize those cases as rape. 
 There are two major theories of consent: the “attitudinal” or mental state 
view, and the “performative” view. The first view focuses on the subjective state 
of the person consenting—whether they wanted to consent or not, despite the 
way they might have acted. In this view, “behavioral or verbal signs are merely 
indications of the person’s mental state; they are not the consent itself.”127 The 
consent itself is the mental state of willing a certain state of affairs. The 
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performative account, on the other hand, requires that consent be communicated. 
If consent has the power to make the impermissible, permissible, it can only do 
this if others are aware of the consent. In order to protect autonomy, consent 
must be communicated.128 In the performative account, consent is more than just 
a mental state; McGregor explains that the performative action combined with 
the proper intent counts as consent.  
Currently, rape law defines “without consent,” and often presumes that 
the default position is consent. The sexual interaction is assumed to be 
consensual unless “without consent” can be proven. This does not give judges or 
juries a clear picture of what “with consent” looks like. In order to make the rape 
statute more clear, “with consent” should be defined. Using what McGregor tells 
us about meaningful consent, the law should define consent in the following 
way: The woman must have the mental state of consenting, communicate that 
consent via her words and behavior, and intend for those words and behavior to 
mean consent. Her actions must also be voluntary and deliberate—that is, she 
consents to intercourse for reasons of her own as opposed to consenting as a 
result of fear or coercion.              
The law already describes some cases where the victim is “incapable of 
consent.” If a person is mentally defective or incapacitated, physically helpless, 
or under 16 years old, the person cannot legally consent. The law also states that 
a person cannot consent if “overcome by deception, coercion, or surprise.” The 
law does not specify exactly what would count as coercion or deception, and it is 
difficult to determine how much coercion undermines consent. MacKinnon, for 
example, thinks all heterosexual relationships are primarily coercive and that 
women’s consent is never meaningful under current social conditions. 
MacKinnon explains:  
  Politically, I call it rape whenever a woman has sex and feels  
  violated. You might think that’s too broad. I’m not talking about  
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  sending all you men to jail for that. I’m talking about attempting to  
  change the nature of the relations between men and women by  
  having women ask ourselves, ‘Did I feel violated?’ To me, part of  
  the culture of sexual inequality that makes women not report rape  
  is that the definition of rape is not based on our sense of our   
  violation.129  
 This analysis is not particularly helpful for determining the legal 
definition of rape, however, since not all sexual situations are equally coercive 
and not all coercion is criminal behavior. For example, a woman might be in a 
situation where her boyfriend threatens to break up with her if she does not have 
sex with him. She could have a variety of reasons for not wishing to engage in 
sex; she might not want to have sex until marriage, she might want to wait until 
the relationship is more stable, or she might be concerned about sexually 
transmitted infections. While we might describe this relationship as coercive or 
“unhealthy,” the man’s behavior is not criminal and the woman is still able to 
choose her own course of action. Abrams would see this as the type of situation 
where the woman can exercise her agency, even if she might be in an undesirable 
situation. The woman might determine that she cares more about the 
relationship than her goal of waiting until marriage, or she might decide that her 
boyfriend is not the type of man she wants to be with since he does not respect 
her values. Either way, the woman is able to exercise some agency within her 
relationship and determine the best course of action for her. 
 In the case described above, it is not unreasonable or illegal for the man to 
request sex from his partner or to make the relationship contingent on sex. 
However, what is reasonable or legal to request changes depending on the 
capacity of the relationship and the nature of the threats. For example, if a male 
therapist threatened to release a female patient’s files if she did not consent to 
sex, the woman faces different sorts of constraints. The relationship between a 
therapist and patient cannot legally be contingent on sex, and the woman might 
fear negative consequences enough to engage in sex. Her “consent” in this case 
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would not be intended, deliberate, or voluntary but instead the result of a highly 
coercive situation. Depending on how much she feared the violation of her 
privacy and the nature of her relationship with the therapist, the woman might 
feel as though she has no other choice. Furthermore, it would not be reasonable 
for the therapist to think the woman was voluntarily consenting to sex with him. 
Other relationships that cannot legally be contingent on sex would be: a teacher 
and a student, a tenant and a landlord, a doctor and a patient, or an employer 
and an employee. Grades, rent, medical treatment, or a salary cannot legally be 
revoked or negotiated with sexual intercourse. It would not be reasonable for an 
employer to think a woman was voluntarily consenting to have sex with him if 
he threatened to fire her, nor would a professor be justified in thinking a student 
was consenting to sex if he threatened to fail her. 
Abrams would likely describe women as having some agency in these 
cases, much like the woman who is faced with losing a relationship if she does 
not consent to sex. A woman could decide that her job is not worth having sex 
with an employer, and suffer the consequences of being fired. She could take 
other action, such as filing sexual harassment charges, but she might not be in 
position to do so. She might not be able to afford to lose her job financially, or 
think the legal process of suing her employer is hopeless. While the women in 
both types of cases have some agency, there is a primary difference between 
them. The man in the dating relationship is not making an unreasonable or 
illegal request, while the teacher/landlord/doctor/employer is. The nature of 
the latter relationships should not be sexual, and the level of constraint placed on 
women’s autonomy is much higher in these cases. Judges and juries should 
recognize these types of constraints as “coercion” in rape trials.  
Besides better accounting for the way coercive sexual situations violate 
women’s autonomy, broadening the definition of “coercion” should help 
promote men’s responsibility. While women are responsible for communicating 
their consent (or nonconsent), men are responsible for listening to women and 
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making sure their partner is consenting. Men often do not think their own 
actions count as rape because aggressive and coercive behavior is often a part of 
“normal” sex. MacKinnon argues that rape is not only commonplace, but 
“indigenous” to women’s experience, not an exception to the rule. The 
prevalence of rape is a result of two truths: forced sex is “central to sexuality,” 
and “sexuality is central to women’s condition.”130 While the law considers rape 
at the private, individual level (an infraction of one man against one woman), 
MacKinnon compares rape to lynching—an act of terrorism “within a systemic 
context of group subjection.” Rape victims are mostly women, rapists are mostly 
men, and “the rape of women by men is integral to the way inequality between 
the sexes occurs in life.”131 For MacKinnon, rape is a sex inequality issue, not just 
a violent gender-neutral crime.  
While liberal feminists like Roiphe think men and women are 
fundamentally the same and that women should strive to be like men, 
MacKinnon thinks there are differences, the primary one being that “women get 
fucked and men fuck.”132 Definitionally, “women are those from whom sex is 
taken.” MacKinnon thinks rape law must be reformed to describe rape in terms 
of the woman’s sense of violation. Currently, the crime of rape revolves a 
masculine sense of what it means to be sexually violated. Penetration itself is the 
violation. As MacKinnon notes, women do feel violated by forced penetration, 
but “penile invasion of the vagina may be less pivotal to women’s sexuality, 
pleasure or violation, than it is to male sexuality.”133 Often after a rape, women 
cannot experience sexual feelings or touching again without reliving or thinking 
about the rape.134 Rape violates more than just a woman’s body; it violates her 
ability to enjoy sex. In many ways, this is the more damaging and lasting 
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violation. What we need to do, MacKinnon thinks, is “change the nature of the 
relations between men and women.” One of the ways we can do this is to 
redefine “normal” sexuality. MacKinnon thinks what currently counts as 
“normal” sex has been created by those in power within oppressive conditions, 
and the line between intercourse and rape is drawn from a masculine 
perspective.135  
Expanding our conception of “coercion” and being clear about what it 
means to consent would help describe rape in terms of women’s sense of 
violation. The law struggles to determine the difference between sex and rape, or 
rather, when sex becomes rape. Because the law is a crude tool that describes 
criminal behavior in abstract terms, it is difficult to account for all the complex 
sexual situations that might be rape. Still, the law could account for some of these 
complexities by dividing rape into the two aforementioned types. Besides 
protecting women’s sexual autonomy, this type of revision to the law would 
have the broader goal of challenging social norms and changing the relationships 
between men and women. If normal sex is no longer the type of sex that makes 
women feel violated, if force and coercion no longer have a place in the bedroom, 
if men learn to listen to women and “no” means “no,” if women do not fear 
repercussions when they say “no,” eventually women’s consent will be 
meaningful.   
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